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James J. Sample
n perhaps no point of modern legal discourse can
such a broad consensus as to fact, if not meaning, be
forged than this: when in the hot seat, Chief Justice
John Roberts turns to baseball. During his confirmation
hearing before the United States Senate, Roberts famously
stated: "Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them ....
They make sure everybody plays by the rules . .. And I will

remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to
pitch or bat."
Chief Justice Roberts's invocation of the judge-as-umpire
metaphor was far from the first such invocation,3 but the
prodigious manner in which he deployed it rendered it a
calling card for the swiftly-confirmed Chief Justice. Further,
its penetration into the confirmation hearing lexicon is so
profound that it has played a significant role in framing the
hearings and political discourse surrounding the confirmations of now-Justices Samuel Alito, Elena Kagan, and Sonia
Sotomayor. Some, however, have noted that the inage of just
calling "balls and strikes" but "'not to pitch or bat" does not
always map easily onto the Roberts Court's jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding such quibbles, given the enduring effectiveness of the metaphor, perhaps it should hardly come as a
surprise that Chief Justice Roberts goes back to baseball in
the effort- which this article finds deeply meritorious-to
quell a portion of the vitriol and controversy over Supreme
Court disqualification practices.
Beneath the title "2011 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary," Chief Justice Roberts wastes no verbiage-spending just three words-before invoking the national pastime.
Connecting baseball to judicial ethics, Chief Justice Roberts
points to the infamous "Black Sox Scandal" and the question,
circa 1919-1922, of whether federal district judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis could ethically "remain on the bench while
serving as Baseball Commissioner."4 Chief Justice Roberts
notes that "Judge Landis resolved his situation by resigning
his judicial commission in 1922 to focus all his efforts on the
national pastime."' It is at this point that the Chief Justice
reveals the purpose of this historical detour-in a 2011 yearend report-saying: "Some observers have recently questioned whether the Judicial Conference's Code of Conduct
for United States Judges should apply to the Supreme Court.
I would like to use my annual report this year to address that
issue, as well as some other related issues that have recently
drawn public attention."'

Court observers, and particularly members of the Supreme
Court Bar familiar with the Court's relatively unfettered
power to manage ministerial internal Court affairs may
James J.Sample isAssociate Professor, Hofstra Law School.

find the Chief Justice's next sentences a tad disingenuous.
Roberts asserts that "[t]he space constraints of the annual
report prevent me from setting out a detailed dissertation on
judicial ethics. And my judicial responsibilities preclude me
from commenting on any ongoing debates about particular
issues" In teims of the ostensible space constraints, it is
worth noting, as just one randomly-selected comparison, that
even including the Appendix, the word count of Roberts's
2011 year-end report is only slightly more than half that of
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's report in 2000.1 Similarly,
only the most rigid of formalists could take seriously Roberts's assertion that, via the report, he was not "commenting
on any ongoing debates about particular issues. . . While
the Chief Justice's report does not mention Justices Thomas
and Kagan by name, the references are so thinly-veiled as
to leave little doubt as to their functional specificity. Adam
Liptak's coverage of the report in The New York Times, for
example, put it this way: "The chief justice's comments
. . . amounted to a vigorous defense of Justices Clarence

Thomas and Elena Kagan, who are facing calls to disqualify
themselves from hearing the health care case, which will be
argued over three days in late March.
As to the gravamen of the matter, Chief Justice Roberts's
"vigorous defense" is both timely and insightful. In my
view, it is also quite correct. To adapt F. Scott Fitzgerald's
meme," when it comes to recusal, the justices of the United
States Supreme Court are simply different from other jurists.
Acknowledging and/or asserting consequences of those differences is far from an uncontroversial endeavor. Indeed, to
further the analogy via the dismissive, even flippant rejoinder
to Fitzgerald's meme-that, when it comes to recusal, the
only difference between the justices of the Supreme Court
and other jurists is that they are justices of the Supreme
Court-is one that has substantial support.
Some of the support for this "fungible" justices-are-justjudges perspective is populist, partisan, and opportunistic. On
the other hand, some of the support for it is deeply principled
and intellectual-grounded in the gravity of genuine conflicts
of interest in the nation's high court. Yet therein lies the
conundrum and the reason the conundrum deserves focused
attention. In an increasingly caustic legal and political environment, separating the shrill cries from the serious concerns
requires a nuanced consideration of historical context. While,
sadly, such historical context is often found wanting in legal
analyses, it is virtually always wanting-or worse, twistedin media, including sound-bite and talk journalism, blogs,
and social media that, while disseminating news, double as
powerful ideological echo chambers in which heat. rather
*than light, is the coin of the realm.
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In researching a forthcoming paper ained at offering that
such considerations, that neithet Justice Thomas's nor Justice
relatively comprehensive historical context through which
Kagan's disqualification from the case is/was requited. Relatoday's discussions might be made more substantive, I realtive to the Cout's historical norms, Justice Kagan's decision
ized that the attempt itself quickly yields a powerful lesson
as to her participation, in light of factual context involving
in perspective. Even if one chooses not to include the easy,
her directly (as opposed to only derivatively as with Justice
bright line disqualification scenarios-stock ownership in a
Thomas's spouse) actually presents a closer call than Justice
company litigating before the high court for example"- and
Thomas's decision as to his own. Each justice, howevet, would
instead trains attention on the kind of factually-intensive gray
serve the Court and the current and future civic discourse on
areas of real-world human interaction that, in today's statutory disqualification by issuing reasoned, transparent analyses of
disqualification terminology fall-if anywhere-into Section
their decisions with regard to their own participation.
455's catch-all provision in which a judge must disqualify
The high profile of the health care law, and the nature of the
himself or herself whenever their impartiality "might reasonheat-rather than light that so marks the partisan opportunism
ably be questioned," one realizes that recusal controversies
and rhetoric surrounding each justice's participation-presents
have often involved giants of the Supreme Court.
an important and teachable moment. To that end, Chief Justice
Further, just as with health care's current prominence as a
Roberts's focus on disqualification in his year-end report is
national issue, instances of arguable conflict form a part of the
a positive step. The Chief Justice's defense of the Court's
tapestry of many of the Court's landmark cases involving-as
disqualification practices boils down to the assertion that when
with health care today-circumstances of extraordinary
it comes to disqualification, the Supreme Court is constitutionnational import. Anecdotally, conflicts from the serious to the
ally and pragmatically different. Clearly, if taken too far, if
specious include sequences ranging from John Marshall, in
invoked as talisman, that reasoning could easily cause more
Marbtry, adjudicating the validity of judicial commissions
problems than it solves for the rule of law.
he had himself signed as Secretary of State--one of which
The Chief Justice's argument is neither emotionally nor
was for none other than his brother James;1 to the Steel
intellectually satisfying. It is my view, however, that in an
Seizure case and multiple justices with arguable conflicts;"
imperfect world, and viewed through the lens of historical
to Thurgood Marshall's long arc, culminating in his decision,
context, it is nonetheless also entirely correct. P
only after decades of remove, to sit on cases involving the
NAACP;' 5 to Justice Scalia and perhaps the best-known duck- 4 Endnotes
hunting trip of all time;'" to Justice O'Connor's election night
1. An extended law review version of this article, entitled "Supreme
outburst preceding Bush v. Gore;17 to profound matters of
Court Recusal from Marbury to the Modern Day" is forthcoming in the
issue identification involving Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in
Fall 2012 issue of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics.
2. Zuzanna Kobrzynski. Balls and Strikes, SLATE (Sept. 13, 2005).
matters of gender equality and criminal sentencing respectively;'" and finally, on the one hand, to Justice Thomas's failure
http://www.slate.com/id/2126289.
to disclose hundreds of thousands of dollars in undisclosed
3. An interesting recent essay finds that the "analogy was originally
income related to Virginia Thomas's work, some of which
intended for trial judges, and was expressly advanced as a model to be
involved opposition to the health care legislation,'I and on
rejected." Aaron S.J. Zelinsky. The Justice As Commissioner: Benching
the other, to Justice Kagan's ill-advised e-mails including the
Sthe Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119YALE L.J. ONLINE 113, 114 (2010).
memorable "I hear they have the votes, Larry!!""
4.See generally Chief Justice Roberts, 2011 Year-End Report on the
Absent long-term, and arguably far-fetched transformaFederalJudiciary, 1(Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
tional changes in Supreme Court practices along the lines
publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endieport.pdf.
suggested by Senate Judiciary Chair Patrick Leahy, that
5Id.
are aimed at reducing the consequences of Supreme Court
6. Id.
disqualifications by taking advantage of the Court's "deep
7. Id.
bench" of retired Article III Supreme Court justices, 2 the
8. Compare id. (totaling aword count of 2,989) with Chief Justice
factors pertaining to the finality of a justice's-as opposed to
Rehnquist, 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary(Jan 1,
ajudge's---disqualification will always hold true. Thus, the
*2001), http://wwwxsupremecourt gov/publicinfo/year-end/2000yearfinality factors, certainly cannot, standing alone, he detere ndreport.aspx (totaling a word count of 5,734).
minative in evety case. When those factors are combined
*9. Chief Justice Roberts. supra note 4. at 3.
with a close examination of the circumstances specific to
*10. See Adam Liptak, ChiefJustice Defends Peers' Hearing Case on
Justice Thomas's situation, I conclude that Justice Thomas's
*HealthLaw, N.Y. TIES, Jan. 1,2012, at Al, available at http://wwwx.
*ny times.com/I2012/01I/01/us/chief-j ustice-backs-peers-decision-to-hearparticipation in reviewing the health care law, as with Justice
helialth-law-caselhtm.
Kagan's, is not only warranted under the rule of law, but
*11. Fitzgerald famously wxrote:
"Let me tell you about the xvery rich.
optimal fot the perceived legitimacy of the Court's decisionwhatevet that decision may be.
IThey are different from you and me." A decade after Fitzgerald's turn
Inthe recusal-esque spitit of full disclosure, this article is Iot phrase, Ernest Henmingway, over lunch with literary critic Mary
authoted by an academic and citizen who hopes to see the
*Colun, floated a trial balloon based on Fitzgerald's line, saying, ' I am
health care ovethaul upheld, but who believes, apart ftom any *getting to know the rich." Colum tartly replied, "rhe only difference
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between the rich and other people is that the rich have more money."
Letter to the Editor. The Rich Are Different, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 13,
1988), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/13/books/
1-the-rich-are-different-907188.html.
12. 28 U.S.C. §455 (d)(4) (2012).
13. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin. What Are the Facts of liarbury v.M~adison?, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 255, 264 n.22 (2003).
14. DAVIDG. MCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 1071 (1992); see also Ed R.
Haden, JudicialSelection: A PragmaticApproach, 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB.POL'Y 531, 538, n.16 (2001).

15. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference,
Oct. 4. 1984, and replies from Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices William Brennan, Byron White, Harry Blackmun. Lewis Powell.

William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra Day O'Connor, all
Oct. 5, 1984, in Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, box 1405, folder 14.
16. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (Scalia,.J.,

mem.).
17. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore:
Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?9, 16 GEO.

J. LEGAL ETHICs

375, 377

(2003).
18. Linda Greenhouse, Legacy ofa Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1996, at

Letter to the

Al; Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., On the Dangerof 11earing Two Hats:
Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 417, 433,
434 (1997).
19. Eric Lichtblau, Thomas Cites Failureto Disclose llife
's Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at Al6.
20. Jake Tapper, Then-Solicitor General Kagan on Health Care Bill
11rote 'IHear They Have The Votes!! Simply Amazing',ABC NEWS
BLOGS (Nov. 16, 2011, 11:32 AM), http://abcnew s.go.com/blogs/
politics/201 1/11/then-solicitor-general-kagan-on-health-care-billwrote-i-hear-they-have-the-votes-simply-amazing/.
21. Senator Leahy's proposed legislation would have allowed a
retired justice to replace a current justice who has recused herself.
Leahy hopes this would encourage justices to recuse themselves
with less hesitation when there is even "an appearance if partiality."
Robert Barnes, A Deep Bench of Substitute Justices Goes Unused,
WASH. PosT,Aug. 9, 2010, available athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/08/AR2010080802629.
html?hpid=topnews. Retired justices have remained active in the
judiciary. For example, since Justice O'Connor's retirement from the
Supreme Court in 2006, she has filled in on and decided cases with
every federal appellate court in the nation, except for the one on which
she was appointed in 1981.
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The reasoning of those opinions is striking. There is almost
no discussion whatsoever about the recipient's fiduciary obliga-

Dear Art,

tion to his or her own client. Nor is there discussion about the
lawyer's obligation of loyalty to her client, which the model
rules say is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship
to the client. Moreover, there is little if any discussion of the
importance of truth in the administration of justice.
Mr. Altman similarly ignores or scants these issues. Nor
does he recognize that the lawyer who misdirects the facts is
his client's agent. Yet in habeas corpus cases, the Supreme
Court has relied on the agency relationship in holding prisoners
on death row responsible for their lawyer's defaults in failing to
file pleadings on time, a doctrine that has resulted in executions
of the clients. Instead, Mr. Altman focuses on confidentiality,

The following is in response to James Altman's article on

Model Rule 4.4(b). In a case in the Eastern District of N.Y.,
Gutman v. Klein, the court ordered the defendant to turn over
his laptop so that it could be copied by the plaintiff's lawyer
and an expert. When the lawyer and the expert arrived at the
appointed time, there was a two-hour delay. When they finally
got the laptop, they found that it was hot to the touch and was
missing a screw from the hard-drive plate, which made them
suspicious.
As a result, the court ordered its own expert to examine
the laptop. The court's expert found that numerous files had
been deleted and were unrecoverable, and also that there were
numerous modifications in documents that were on the laptop.
Accordingly, the judge entered a default judgment against the
defendant for spoliation of evidence and ordered that attorney's

fees be given by the defendant to the plaintiff for the time
involved. The judge explained, "It is impossible to know what
[plaintiffs] would have found if [defendants] and [their]counsel
had complied with their discovery obligations."
Assume a similar situation, but that the spoliation or withholding of discovery is revealed because the defendant misdirected a fax to the plaintiff. As a practical matter, that case
is indistinguishable from Gutman v. Klein. Nevertheless, Mr.
Altman agrees with ethics opinions that would exclude the evidence of spoliation discovered through reading the errant fax.

despite the fact that any obligation of confidentiality is that of

the sending lawyer, not the recipient.
I suspect that a principal reason for requiring receiving law-

yers to put the interests of their adversaries above the interests
of their own clients, is to protect fellow lawyers from malpractice actions. In any event, there are opinions that say just that.
In my viewv, that should not trump the lawyer's fiduciary relationship to the client, the lawyer's duty of loyalty, the lawyer's status as the client's agent, the fact that the confidentiality
at issue is not that of the receiving lawyer but of her adversary,
and the trial as a search for truth.
Best regards,
Monroe Freedman
law mhf@hofstra.edu
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Whon Character and Finoss DisClosurs Collido
(Continuedfrom page 1)

amendment explaining the nondisclosed information and the
reason for the nondisclosure. Currently, four of the five ABA
accredited law schools in Georgia are using a Declaration of
Disclosure or other document with similar language. (See
sidebar for the Declaration of Disclosure used by Georgia
State University College of Law.) Other schools in other
states make similar requirements. However, the Georgia
Board appears to be the only board of law examiners currently organizing a statewide effort. The benefit of statewide
uniformity is obvious. The overwhelming majority of Georgia graduates seeking admission to the bar are subject to the
same set of rules before applying to the Georgia Board. Prior
to receiving the juris doctorate degree, students must sign a
declaration affirming the information provided on their otiginal law school applications, or request permission to amend.
This results in a majority of Georgia graduates arriving at
the Georgia Board in the same boat so to speak. While there
is not necessarily uniformity in terms of how each of the
participating Georgia law schools will respond to a request to
amend the original application, at least there is uniformity in
that the majority of students were asked to amend or swear to
their original answers prior to receiving their degrees.
The steps the Georgia Board is encouraging Georgia law
schools to take are important for two reasons. First, the law
school will not be placed in the situation of having to decide
how to address a fraudulent application after a student has
graduated, though it still may be placed in a situation where it
must decide whether to revoke admission of a current student
based upon a fraudulent application, or administer some other
form of sanction for nondisclosure. The Thomas M. Cooley
Law School was required to make such a decision in In re
Application of Otterman. . In that case, the applicant failed to
disclose his past legal problems on his application, including several alcohol-related offenses. Several months after

application out of a gray area of how he or she may behave
with a law license, and provided evidence that may be used

to reach the conclusion that he or she is willing to lie when it
counts. This is precisely the information boards consider when
deciding how the applicant's past acts may predict his or her
future behavior should the law license be approved.
While the Georgia approach assists with the disclosure dilemma for in-state graduates seeking admission to the Georgia
bar, it does not address inconsistent disclosures when dealing with out-of-state graduates requesting a license. Recent
graduates seeking to be admitted to a bar of a state other than
where they graduated is commonplace, as is attorneys seeking
to either add bar licenses to their resumes or relocate. In this
latter instance, attorneys with years of practice under their
belts find themselves in the same situation as a new graduate seeking a bar license - the information disclosed on their
law school applications is relevant, and what they may have
stated or omitted years ago will be subject to scrutiny. In other
words, regardless of whether an applicant filled out a law
school application yesterday or a decade ago, the statements,
omissions and descriptions contained on those pages are still
relevant, and instead of being sent to a shredder the application
likely will be part of your permanent character and fitness file.
It is likely that other boards of law examiners will move
in the direction of Georgia, and encourage the law schools in
their states to require similar declarations from students prior
to graduation. However, it is too early to determine whether
the Georgia approach will gain enough momentum to become
a national trend. The states that adopt the declaration requirement will still have to address the dilermna of inconsistent
character and fitness applications, but hopefully less frequently. While this will not eliminate the problem, it certainly will
reduce it, and for a board of law examiners that can only be

considered a positive and much needed development. P

enrolling, the applicant voluntarily admitted that he failed to
disclose his convictions and offenses. In response, the school
suspended the applicant for one year and placed him on
permanent probation. The applicant was readmitted after the
one year suspension, and later completed his studies.
Second, requiring students to submit the sworn document alleviates the quandary for the board of law examiners
because it reduces the instances where an applicant has fully

1. Patricia Sexton is a Shareholder with Polsinelli Shughart's
Kansas City, Missouri office. She is the current Vice-President ofAthe
Missouri Board of Law Examiners ("MBLE"). The content of this
article does not represent the views of the Supreme Court of Missouri
or the MBLE.
2 The Florida Board of Bar Examiners ("Florida Board") found

disclosed on the character and fitness application but not on

that the failure to disclose information on university and law school

the law school application, at least as amended. To the extent
the applicant signs the declaration stating he or she has fully
disclosed all issues on the law school application when they
have not done so, the applicant has made the character and
fitness issue mote serious but also much mote clear to the

applications is a basis for denying admission to the bar when considered collectively with other misconduct In Florida Board of Bair
Examiners re RLW. 793 So.2d 918 (Fla 2001), the Florida Board
recommended that the applicant's request for admission be denied
and he be disqualified from reapplying for admission for a period
of het years because, in part, he failed to disclose the following: 1)
the educational institutions he attended: 2) certain debts, 3) the fact
he had been married, 4) that he had been a party to litigation during
his divorce: and 5) that he had previously been charged with a traffic
ticket. Id. at 920-21. In reaching its recommendation to disqualify the

board of law examiners. An applicant who submits a less than

truthful law school application and then again fails to disclose
the information on the declaration has built a compelling
tecotd that demonstrates he or she has a candot issue. At
that point, the applicant has moved the charactet and fitness

Endnotes
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applicant, the Florida Board determined that the numerous failures
to disclose were "collectively disqualifying." Id. at 923. The Florida
Board further determined that there was a great deal of "circumstantial evidence" contradicting the assertion that the applicant's failure to
disclose was an "oversight" or "due to inadvertence." Id. at 924. The
Florida Supreme Court approved the Florida Board's recommendation. Id. at 927-28. Denying an application for admission based. in
part, on failing to disclose information on a law school application is

not a novel theme when considered collectively with other character
and titness issues. Florida Board of Bar Examiners re MAR.. 755
So.2d 89 (Fla. 2000) (misrepresenting facts on law school application
when considered with other factors basis for denial of admission);
Florida Board of Bar Examiners re PK.B., 753 So.2d 1285 (Fla.
2000) (failing to disclose certain criminal charges on law school application considered in denying applicant admission).
3. 835 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 2005).

Decaraion of Disoosure for 2011-2012
Your College of Law application includes the following questions:
21. Have you ever been expelled, suspended, or placed on probation or discipline, academic or otherwise, by any school, university,
college, trade or professional organization for any reason?
22. Are you aware of any circumstances in your background that might prohibit you from being admitted to the practice of law?
23. Excluding PARKING violations, have you ever been detained, arrested, formally accused, cited or prosecuted for the violation
of any law? IMPORTANT NOTE: You must disclose each instance even ifthe charges have been dismissed or you were acquitted
or allowed to plead nolo contendere or adjudication was withheld or a conviction was reversed, set aside or vacated or the record
sealed or expunged and regardless of whether you have been told you need not disclose any such instance. Such instances do
not necessarily disqualify you from admission to the law school. All circumstances are carefully considered by the College of Law
Admissions Committee.
At the end of your application, you confirmed and agreed with the following statement.
I certify that the information provided herein is true, to the best of my knowledge, and I understand that any omission or
misrepresentation may result in the invalidation of this application, revocation of a favorable admission decision, discipline under
the College of Law Honor Code, report to the Law School Admission Council Misconduct and Irregularities Subcommittee., report to
the appropriate bar authorities or any other action appropriate under the circumstances. I further certify that the personal statement
submitted herewith is my own original work. I also agree to obtain copies of the College of Law Bulletin and/or Student Handbook,
as well as the Honor Code. and to abide by the rules and policies therein. I understand that receipt of a law degree does not
entitle one to be admitted to the bar, and it is incumbent upon all applicant to review the fitness requirements and other local rules
governing admission to the practice of law. Georgia's rules may be found at: http://www.gabaradmissions.org.
Complete Part A or B,not both, on the reverse sei. Rotun tihe completIed form no later tihan 81511. You may tur n tin at the
Professiomalism Orientation session, deliver itin UL 417 or scar and email it to Bernitha H 3aris
(bharris@gsu.edu). A copy of this
doeumentwill be placed in youir peranent fie.
Complete Part A or B below, not both, and return it no later than 815/11= You rMay turn it in at the Professionaism Orientation session,
deliver it to UL 417 or scan and email it to Bernitta Harrist (bharris@gsu.edu) A copy of this document will be put in your permanent *ile
Part A

The responses I have provided to all questions on my application (and any previously submitted amendments thereto) for admission
to the College of Law are accurate and complete.
Name (print):
Signature:
Date:
Part B

I request permission to amend my application (and any previously submitted amendments thereto), as stated below. I understand
that the College of Law will review this request and decide what action(s) to take in response hereto. The College of Law's actions
may include acceptance of the amendment with no consequences, the filing of an Honor Code charge, revocation of my admission or
any other action deemed appropriate under the circumstances. I understand that the factors the College of Law takes into account
in deciding what actions to take include, but are not limited to, the submission date of this request, the date and seriousness of any
matter(s) reported herein, post-occurrence behavior and any intent to deceive the College of Law. The College of Law has made no
representations or promises to me as to what actions it would take in my individual case.
I understand that when I apply for certification of fitness to sit for the bar exam, Georgia's Office of Bar Admissions will be given
access to my application and this and any other amendments thereto, and will compare my submissions to them and the College of
Law.
Name (print).
Signature:

Date.
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